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A STUDY OF CIVIL DISORDER IN DETROIT
ELLIOT D. LUBY* and JAMEs HEDEGARD**
Civil disorder is defined by Bowen and Massoti' as violence directed
against the people or property which are the representations or agents
of the established political or civil order. Riots can be a form of civil
disorder distinguishable from revolutions or coups d'etat in that they
are spontaneous, disorganized, unplanned, and are not attempts to over-
throw or to seize state power.
The history of such outbursts in the United States is the history of
the conflict between those ethnic and religious groups which first held
the land and those which came later to claim their stake in it. Mob
violence in which Negroes and whites are the antagonists has been of
two types. The first is the white-dominated, black-body-oriented riot
which began following World War I, in which white mobs responded
to the threat of black competition by direct assault with intent to
murder or mutilate. The Detroit riot of 1943 is a case in point, although
Negroes who were recent migrants to this city fought back. The riots
of the sixties on the other hand have been black-dominated and white-
property-oriented, and assaults upon persons have been infrequent.
Beginning with the Watts riot of 1964, a riot ideology has spread
across the land to every northern city with a large Negro population.
Tomlinson 2 was the first to predict this epidemic and his prophecy
that black rioting in American cities would inexorably have to run
its course was astonishingly correct.
Attempts to explain black rioting in the sixties have varied from
the "mad dog," "hoodlum" hypotheses of the conservative right, to
the revolutionary ideology of the new left emphasizing the moral
supremacy and courage of those who take to the streets to oppose ex-
ploitqtion and oppression.
*B.S., University of Missouri, 1947; M.D., Washington University in St. Louis, 1949.
Associate Director, Lafayette Clinic and Professor of Psychiatry and tLaw, Wayne
State University.
**B.S., Ohio Wesleyan, 1957; Ph.D., Univ. of Mich., 1968. Research Associate in
Psychology, University of Michigan.
N.B.: The research for this article was conducted under a grant from the National
Institute of Mental Health.
1. D. BowEN & L. MAsson, CIVIL VIOLENCE: A THEORMaCAL OVERVIEW (1968).
2. Tomlinson, The Development of a Riot Ideology Among Urban Negroes, 2
AMER. BEvxoIRAL ScIENTis-r (March-April, 1968).
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The psychological states which are proposed as precursors for street
violence have been described on a spectrum from hopelessness, apathy,
and despair, to the exhilaration of rising expectations and emerging
self-esteem. These unitary points of view so obviously dependent upon
the political persuasion and belief system of the observer have been
less than objective, even among academicians who have displayed a
remarkable tendency to become emotionally over-involved in a process
which they were expected to study with some scientific detachment.
It is difficult, however, to be dispassionate about violence whether one
is throwing rocks through store windows or attempting to understand
its seeming irrationality at scientific meetings.
Political science and sociological models for civil disorder have
stressed the purposive behavior of the mob and the relationship of
civil disorder to a general movement with political, economic, and
psychological goals. Thus the rising expectation, relative deprivation
model conceptualizes civil disorder in this decade as resulting from real
progress with concomitant hopefulness but a sense of distance between
either the real and ideal or the Negro and white as regards affluence
and life style. According to Davies7. when an economic downturn oc-
curs following a period of progress and hope, impatience becomes
greater and behavior more extreme.
Another theory relates civil disorder to the absence of institutionalized
channels for the expression of grievances and to feelings of political
impotence; the inability to control or even influence those vital govern-
mental decisions which affect one's life. Street violence is then seen
as a form of expressive communication in which dissent and protest
are dramatically acted out in an effort to alter a social system which
the mob deems intolerable. Spiegel" has described the dynamics of the
riot as communication. According to Spiegel, there are four social
conditions which usually precede urban riots. The first is a severe
conflict of values or the failure to apply egalitarian values to all ethnic
groups. The second is the existence of a "hostile belief system" in the
minds of an aggrieved group as among the Detroit arrestees toward
merchants and the police. The third precondition is a failure of com-
munication between the hostile and the dominant group as exemplified
by the notion that all rioters are hoodlums, or the inability to acknowl-
edge the frustration, deprivation, and inequalities of ghetto life.
3. Davies, Toward a Theory of Revolution, 27 AMER. SocioL. REV. (Feb., 1962).
4. Spiegel, The Nature of the Riot Process, PSYCHIATRIC OPINION (June, 1968).
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Finally, there is a failure of social control. It becomes a police matter,
although police do not have the power to correct the conditions which
underlie a riot. The police may then under or overcontrol, leading to
an expansion of the riot. The riot then begins with a precipitating
incident, perhaps a brutal arrest or some act which confirms the hos-
tile belief system of the aggrieved group. The second phase occurs
when a crowd gathers and a confrontation results between police and
citizens. The riot may die or escalate here dependent upon police be-
havior or the provocative presence of militants who exhort the mob
to further action. Phase three, the "Roman Holiday," develops if po-
lice action is ineffective and here the participants are youths, accord-
ing to Spiegel, who in a state of angry intoxication, taunt the police,
burn stores with molotov cocktails, and set the stage for looting. This
"Roman Holiday" may then progress to an all-out war between mili-
tants and police, National Guard, and federal troops. Civil disorder
in Detroit was a classic example of Spiegel's general system theory of
riot evolution and mob interaction with counter-riot forces.
The Detroit riot began in the early hours of Sunday morning, July
23, 1967, following a routine raid on a "blind pig." As the arrested
were being escorted to paddy wagons, the onlooking night people be-
came unruly and berated the police, accusing them of brutality. By
5:00 a.m., a large crowd had gathered and, after exhortations by vari-
ous members, it suddenly became unified and swept up Twelfth Street
breaking store windows and looting. There were only 193 patrolmen
on the streets at that time, a minimum force allocated to a period in
which an outbreak of civil disorder was deemed highly unlikely. By
8:30 a.m., the riot-trained mobile task force was on duty and was
sent to the area. By 10:00 a.m., these units were recalled because their
presence was considered to be provocative and a lull occurred during
which crowds wandered without direction exchanging rumors and
shouting abusive epithets at the police. Just before noon United States
Congressman John Conyers together with some well-known Negro
clergymen attempted to disperse the crowd, only to be shouted down.
Riot control techniques utilizing restraint combined with an impervi-
ousness to the goading of the crowd (so highly successful in the
aborted Kercheval Street riot of the year before) could not defuse
the mob. A sweep was tried, but the police were so few in number
and the mob so large that the tactic was utterly ineffective. Looting
began anew followed by arson while the police stood passively by
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powerless to control a surging, heedless mob of nearly five thousand
people running from one side of Twelfth Street to the other as in a
wild carnival orgy. Later it was said that a field decision was made
not to fire upon looters because of the presence of so many women
and children and in order not to arouse even greater violence. Deputy
Police Commissioner Hubert Locke was later to state that "human life
was given priority over property," evidently in the hope that avoiding
a massive confrontation with shooting would allow the riot process
to run its course without escalation. The enforced passivity of the
police under these circumstances must have had its psychological ef-
fects upon their later behavior. Policemen are not robots and although
professionalism dictates that personal feeling never interfere with
proper conduct, the fear and rage building in those early riot hours
must have been expressed in a variety of ways after prolonged exposure
to danger and sleep deprivation. Hatred and anxiety usually suppressed
in the cool civility of day-to-day conduct broke through in vulnerable
officers although their number was considered to be small. According
to Locke, the crucial time occurred somewhere between Tuesday
night and Wednesday morning, perhaps when fatigue was greatest
and impulse control accordingly diminished.
Following the pattern of previous civil disturbances, the violence
of the second night of the riot exceeded that of the first. Sniper fire
was reported by police and National Guardsmen, and fire stations
and police posts were said to be under attack. Arsonists set twice as
many fires that night as they had on Sunday.
Monday night and through the succeeding three days the riot settled
into a grim war between rioters and arsonists on the one hand and po-
lice, the National Guard, and federal troops on the other. Forty-three
deaths, predominantly Negro, resulted from that awful carnage to-
gether with an estimated sixty-four million dollars in property dam-
age. Seventy-two hundred men, women and children were arrested
and detained in jails, state and federal prisons, bath-houses, garages,
and buses.
Detroit did not anticipate its burning. Unlike Newark and Watts,
it had a progressive mayor sensitive to racial injustice, and innovative
in the construction of model programs to rehabilitate the inner city.
Of all the large northern cities, Detroit had a reputation as a place
.where the Negro could make it. Ghettoes as they could be found in
Newark or Chicago were said not to exist in Detroit. Negroes were
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scattered widely over the city, often in pleasant, solid brick homes in
attractive neighborhoods. J. A. Lukas5 reported in the New York Times
that "Detroit has no slums to match New York's Harlem or Bedford
Stuyvesant, Chicago's southside or Cleveland's Hough section." At-
tempting to describe the area in which the riot began, Lukas said,
"Even by Detroit's standards, 12th Street and the West side neighbor-
hood around it are several notches up the pole."
Relationships between Detroit Negroes and city government were
said to be among the most harmonious in the urban North. A quota-
tion from an article" by the distinguished urbanologist, D. P. Moynihan,
is illustrative:
Detroit had everything the Great Society could wish for a mu-
nicipality. A splendid mayor and a fine governor. A high paying
and, thanks to the fiscal policies of the national government, a
booming industry, civilized by and associated with the hands-
down leading liberal trade union of the world.
Moreover, it was a city whose Negro residents had every rea-
son to be proud of the position they held in the economy and
government of the area. With two able and promising Negro
congressmen, Detroit, at the time the rioting broke out, actu-
ally had one-half the Negro membership of the House of Repre-
sentatives. Relations between the Negro community and City
Hall could hardly have been better. Detroit Negroes held power-
ful positions throughout the city administration, and to cap mat-
ters, the city was equipped with the very model of a summer task
force, with a solid program and a 24-hour watch to avert vio-
lence.
All of this was true but there were other, less favorable forces operat-
ing in Detroit that summer whose peace disturbing potential went
unrecognized by its citizenry. Rapport between police and Negroes
left much to be desired despite community relations programs and the
presence of a capable Negro clergyman as an assistant commissioner.
The killing of a Negro prostitute, in 1963, by a police officer attempt-
ing to make an arrest still had its effect four years later and its memory
was reactivated by the unsolved murder of another prostitute in the
spring of 1967, a murder for which the police were held culpable by
some in the Negro community. Negroes were so sensitive to the issue
5. Lukas, Whitey Hasn't Got the Message, N. Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1967 (Magazine).
6. Detroit Free Press, Oct. 7, 1967 (Magazine).
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of police brutality that the Michigan Chronicle, a black newspaper, em-
ployed a reporter solely to document instances of verbal or physical
abuse of black people by police officers.
Separation between Negroes and whites both in residential and inter-
actional terms was also widening. Unpublished research reported in
the Detroit Free Press by sociologist Ralph Smith7 of Eastern Michigan
University demonstrated a pattern of increasing social distance be-
tween white and Negro citizens of the Detroit metropolitan area.
Segregated housing and social insularity were correlated so that little
inter-racial social contact occurred. Acquisition of the data began
in 1965, and its analysis contradicted a persisting myth that integration
was progressing in this city at a rate exceeding that of any other com-
munity in the country.
The findings of the Transportation and Land Use Study conducted
by Irving Rubin also indicated that all was not well.8 The white
population of Detroit was found to be considerably older than the
Negro, further evidence of young white exodus to the suburbs and
accelerating separation. Little difference was discovered between white
and Negro income for those people living within the city limits, but
marked disparities were noted between suburban white income and
Detroit Negro and white income. The most impressive statistic was
the comparison between the median income for whites in the three
county area surrounding Detroit and the income for Negroes. Ac-
cording to Rubin, "[m] edian income of Detroit area Negro families
in 1950 was 79 percent that of white families. By 1960 it had de-
clined to 61 percent. In 1965 it was 62 percent."
A study of unemployment in the inner city by Helling, Faber, and
Isajiw9 was completed a few months prior to the riot and actually
involved a part of the riot area and sections of the city contiguous to
it. They confirmed Rubin's finding that young whites are deserting
the city while older retired whites remain. On the other hand, the city
for the Negro becomes a place of permanent residence and he, for a
multitude of reasons, does not have comparable mobility. Among the
7. Detroit Free Press, Sept. 10, 1967.
8. The Transportation and Land Use Study was conducted by the University of
Michigan in 1965 and 1966, under the direction of Irving Rubin. Its purposes were
the acquisition of data on the social, economic and demographic characteristics of
a three county metropolitan area, together with information about all travel behavior
within the area on any given day. The data is to be used in expressway and other
urban planning.
9. HELLING, FAVER & IsAJIW, UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN INNER CITY CODE AREA (1967).
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more important information supplied by this study was the high un-
employment rate of Negro males between '14 and 24 (21 percent)
and the relatively low (five percent) rate for white males in the same
age group. More than twice as many Negroes as whites were found
to be receiving public aid. Despite substantially the same level of edu-
cation, many more whites than Negroes in the sample were in pro-
fessional, managerial, or clerk-sales occupations. Occupational mobility
for Negro males was restricted to blue collar jobs while females were
more mobile into white collar positions. Entry into the middle-class
for Negro families in this geographical area was dependent upon the
upward mobility of the female, unlike suburban white families where
achievement opportunities for males allowed them to earn this dis-
tinction.
Finally, white businesses such as groceries, credit furniture stores,
dry cleaners, drug stores, and pawn shops, many with the familiar
steel gates to protect windows, could be found on main thoroughfares
in predominantly lack sections. These are the establishments which
Kenneth Clark'0 accused of keeping Negroes in economic serfdom,
and which black nationalist leaders depict as the agents of an oppres-
sive white colonialism. Black civil disorder in every major American
city has been characterized by attacks upon these establishments and
Detroit was no exception.
Despite racial distancing and growing Negro animosity toward po-
lice and merchants, white Detroit in the period immediately preceding
the riot had a self-image as an enlightened, socially conscious com-
munity with reasonably decent housing and well compensated em-
ployment available to those who wanted to work. The events of the
last week in July, 1967, came as an enormous and terrifying surprise
to the citizens of this city.
METHODOLOGY
We have deemed it useful to study the Detroit riot by approaching
individual participants and determining their demographic character-
istics, political, and social attitudes and their developmental histories.
The understanding of a riot as a system would then be complemented
by some knowledge of those who were on the streets and predis-
posed to violence. Comparison of such an action group with a ran-
domly selected community sample might result in a greater compre-
10. K. CLARK, DARK GHET ro (1965).
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hension of those long-term factors which build toward violence and
the construction of both public and private programs to prevent it.
This was one major focus of our riot aftermath research. Another
focus to be described in this paper deals with community responses
to the riot.
A number of studies"1 have already defined the self-reported rioter
and the 'arrestee in several cities across the country. He has been
described as Negro, between the ages of 15 and 24, and a life-long resi-
dent of the city in which the riot occurred. His education was some-
what superior to the inner city average and economically he was on
the same level as his neighbors. He was also characterized as unskilled
and only. intermittently employed at menial jobs. Noted also were
his racial pride, his hostility toward whites, and his greater awareness
of politics than those not involved in rioting. Family structure was
also not significantly different from the non-activist at least as far
as being brought up in a home with a father is concerned. As will be
seen, the profile of the male Detroit riot arrestee is somewhat at variance
with this description and in some respects dissimilar to the community
from which he comes.
There are serious doubts that the arrestees fully represent those who
rioted. A number of observations suggest that indeed they do not.
The peak intensity arrest period occurred between 6:00 p.m. on the
first day and 2:00 a.m. the following morning. Relatively few people
were detained during the onset stage Sunday morning and in the fol-
lowing ten hours until the police and National Guard were able to
mount sufficient force to move into the riot area. Additionally, the
largest number of fires were set on the second night at a time when
the arrest rate abruptly declined. Thus the members of the riot van-
guard went unapprehended together with that segment of rioters who
probably committed the more serious offenses. Finally, the number
of women arrested does not accurately reflect female involvement
because of the reluctance of police to place them in custody. Never-
theless the arrestees were on the streets and as close as we could come
to an action group.
From a total of 7,200 who were arrested, we randomly selected a
seven percent sample. Eighty-seven and seven-tenths percent of that
sample was male and t2.3 percent was female; 90.3 percent was Negro
11. See, e.g., REPORT OF Thm NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
(1968).
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and 9.7 percent was white. For the purposes of this paper, we selected
from this sample only Negro males 18 and over providing us with a
total of 233 subjects. Our community sample of Negroes and whites
was drawn from the entire city of Detroit plus several small cities
surrounded by or adjacent to Detroit. (These were Hamtramck, High-
land Park, the various Grosse Pointes, and Harper Woods.) Within
Detroit we sampled at triple density within the "riot area," an area
which included most of the apparently riot-relevant fires.
We drew our sample primarily from a directory of all addresses
(in *the city of Detroit and in the additional cities mentioned above).
We randomly selected about five hundred points of entry in the
directory and selected up to four apparent residential addresses at
each point (we selected the first, 11th, 21st and 31st address at each
point, if each appeared to be residential). Having about eighteen hun-
dred addresses, we divided our set of sampling points into (a) those
within our riot area, and (b) those outside. We selected sufficient
points in (a) and (b) so that, by selecting all four addresses at each
point in (a) and the first two of our addresses at each point in (b),
we would have five hundred addresses inside the riot area, and five
hundred outside. We then randomly selected from the five hundred
addresses inside the riot area, to give us addresses to add in direct propor-
tion to those outside the riot area to provide a random sample of ad-
dress pairs in the cities.
When we needed more addresses we randomly drew into our two
samples, which we called (1) city-wide sample and (2) riot area supple-
ment sample.
Since the directory was not up-to-date, we obtained additional inter-
view addresses via a block-supplement technique. Our interviewers
and race-matching technique were similar to those above.
In setting up control groups of Negro males, we sometimes used all
male respondents from (2) the riot-area supplement sample, and some-
times chose from (1) the community sample. When arrestees' ad-
dresses were plotted on a map of Detroit, it was apparent that large
numbers came from outside the "riot areas," as we defined them. This
suggested that, with some constraints such as geographical proximity
to areas of riot activity, rioters were drawn from the geographical
bulk of the Negro community in Detroit. (Departures from this might
make an interesting paper in itself.) For this reason, it didn't seem
necessary to confine our controls to the riot area. Also, we found
[Vol. 10:586
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as we compared interviews of riot-area respondents with those from
outside that there were, for the great bulk of items, only small dif-
ferences in response frequencies. The community control group finally
comprised some 153 Negro males. The total community sample con-
sisted of 850 interviews, almost evenly divided between white and
black respondents. The interviewers were those with previously sur-
vey-interview experience, school-teachers from central city schools,
and individuals sent by local civil rights organizations. The race of the
interviewer was matched to the race of the respondent. Respondents
were seen in their homes.
Our interviewing instrument covered such areas as basic demo-
graphic variables; awareness of and attitudes toward Negro leaders and
institutions; feeling about community forces as storeowners, police,
etc.; involvement in federal programs; attitudes toward and explana-
tions of the riot; beliefs about the future of race relations in Detroit;
and, finally, past and present family structure data. In this paper,
comparisons are drawn between those who were on the streets and
arrested and those Negro men from the riot area who were not ar-
rested and presumably avoided the riot on key variables as age, region
of socialization, employment, level of grievance, education, organiza-
tional affiliation, possession of white friends, past and present family
structure, knowledge of political groups or leaders, and progress and
hope.
White sociologists and black militants have been critical of riot re-
search carried out by white, middle-class scientists. Their position
seems to be that only Negroes can understand Negroes and that our
perspective will necessarily be biased by our own social class and color.
Such a white perspective probably influenced the manner in which
this research was conceptualized, the selection of variables to be studied,
and the methods utilized for their measurement. Our discipline biases
are obvious to the reader. Our biases of language, of form and of ab-
straction we have tested in part by having various persons (both black
and white, middle and lower-class, militant and conservative) rework,
administer, interpret, and code some of our interviews. Generally it
appears that the information we were able to obtain from respondents
is stable, does not depend upon peculiarities of language or choice of
concepts and abstractions. At least our interviews got at what we were
seeking and what we report here as data.
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RESULTS
Age
The median age of those arrestees over 18 was 24, some 17 years
younger than the median age of the community riot area sample of
Negro males which was 41. Not surprisingly, youth was a significant
factor in determining who would be on the streets and, perhaps, who
the police would be most likely to arrest.
Marital Status
The arrestees were also significantly less married than the controls,
39.2 percent as contrasted with 61.4 percent. Naturally their youth
would be expected to influence their marriage rate.
TABLE 1
MARITAL STATUS
Riot Area
Arrestees Controls
Married........................... 39.2% 61.4%
Single ................................ 46.5% 19.0%
Divorced ............................. 3.4% 5.9% I
Separated ............................. 9.0% 7.8%
W idowed ............................. 1.7% 3.9%
However, even when age was controlled, the arrestees were still dis-
covered to be significantly more disposed to remain in the single state.
Employment
Unemployment rates of 16 percent for the arrestees and 7.2 percent
for community males appear to be significantly different. When age
is controlled, however, unemployment rates are very much the same in
the 30 to 49 age group but slightly higher for the arrestees in the
20 to 29 age group. Thirteen and seven-tenths percent of the arrestees
were students, one-half of whom were working full or part-time while
only 1.7 percent of the riot area Negroes were still in school.
[Vol. 10:586
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TABLE 2
EMPLOYMENT
Riot Area
Arrestees Controls
Employed ............................ 70.3% 82.4%
Unemployed .......................... 16.0% 7.2%
Retired .............................. 0% 8.5%
Students ............................. 13.7% 1.3%
Non-Codable ......................... 0% .6%
Eighty-two percent of the non-student arrestees were fully employed.
It is hardly surprising that unemployment increases as age decreases
and that the most serious problem resides in the 17 to 24 age group
among both arrestees and controls. The lower overall unemployment
rate for the controls simply reflects the fact that their median age is
some 17 years older than the arrestees. Joblessness then can hardly be
considered as a crucial factor determining who would assume the risk
of being on the streets during a major riot and after a curfew had
been imposed. All of the arrestees were unskilled or semi-skilled work-
ers, a large percentage of whom were working in an automobile factory
and malting an average of $115 weekly for which they put in more
than 40 hours. Although we do not at this time have the exact per-
centage, there were a few white-collar and skilled workers in the
control group but, unfortunately, information about their income was
not analyzed.
Area of Socialization
The arrestees were more frequently socialized in large urban settings
than the riot area control group. Only five percent were raised on a
farm as compared to 15 percent of the controls. Eighteen percent of the
arrestees were brought up in small towns, a figure reasonably close
to the 22 percent for the riot area controls. However, 77 percent of
the arrestees were socialized in a small or large city (predominantly
large), while only 58.8 percent of the controls grew up in an urban
environment.
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TABLE 3
AREAS OF SOCIALIZATION
Arrestees Controls
Farm ................................ 5.0% 15.0%
Small Town ........................... 18.0% 22.0%
Small City ............................ 16.0% 14.4%
Large City ........................... 61.0% 44.4%
The arrestees also were more likely to have spent their early, de-
velopmental years in Detroit, than were the controls who were more
likely to have been born or raised elsewhere and to have migrated to
this city at a much later age. (See Table 4.)
TABLE 4
How OLD W EN CAME To DETROIT
Arrestees Controls
Born in Detroit or came under the age of 11 59.4% 36.4%
Migrated after age 11 .................. 36.9% 58.4%
However, when we attempted to achieve equivalency between ar-
restees and riot area subjects by controlling for age, differences in
area of socialization diminished. Arrestees were found to be more
likely to have been born in the South and equally likely to have been
raised in the North as comparably aged controls. The proportion
raised in large cities were also found to be about the same for the two
groups. Moreover, when we examine the control group alone, a con-
nection can be noted between migration to Detroit during the early
socialization years (i.e., prior to age 15) and a tendency towards mili-
tancy as defined by a self-expressed readiness to participate in a riot.
In addition, respondents who were early-aged migrants from the South
were more likely to express this form of "militancy" than those who
were born and raised in the city of Detroit. These data suggest that
movement between cultural milieus with such widely disparate values
and expectancies as exist between South and North during crucial child-
[Vol. 10:586
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hood years predisposes to "militancy." It was interesting that the group
who came to Detroit after the fifteenth year were least likely to ex-
press this form of "militancy." The circumstances under which the
older migrants came to Detroit may well have been different inasmuch
as some might have left the South without family.
Education
The community sample was better educated at the time of the riot.
Table 5 below shows that 8.5 percent either completed or had some
college education while no arrestees progressed this far. The percentage
completing high school was almost precisely the same.
TABLE 5
Arrestees Controls
Completed College ..................... 0% 2.0%
Some College ......................... 0% 6.5%
Completed High School ................ 39.0% 39.9%
Some High School ..................... 43.0% 24.8%
Grade School ......................... 18.0% 22.0%
Yet many arrestees were still students and a much higher percentage
had some high school training than the community controls. In order
to determine if these differences in attained formal education might be
a function of the fact that a higher percentage of arrestees were still
in school, we controlled for age between the two groups. In all age
groupings the arrestees had less formal education than the controls.
TABLE 6
PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS WHO COMPLETED HIGH SCHOOL
SAMPLE 20-29 30-39 40-49
Arrestees ................. 58% (46/79) 38% (20/53) 35% (15/43)
Control Males ............ 67% (24/36) 68% (21/31) 53% (27/51)
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Affiliation
Affiliation with organizations which might implement personal or
racial goals was considerably greater among the community sample
than it was in the arrestee group. Church membership did not differ
but the arrestees were otherwise strikingly unaffiliated, belonging to
few organizations supporting racial and neighborhood solidarity or im-
provement.
TABLE 7
ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATION
Arrestees Controls
Church .............................. 39.0% 42.1%
Race Groups .......................... 8.0% 27.1%
PTA ................................. 2.0% 19.7%
Block Club ........................... 12.0% 26.1%
We suspected that such disaffiliation was a function of age rather
than motivation or interest, but cross-tabulation of age with affiliation
did not reveal the expected correlation other than for church member-
ship. Here, church affiliation was lowest in both groups for the youngest
respondents.
Grievance Level
The level of grievance in a particular group would logically be ex-
pected to influence its protest or violence threshhold. The Detroit ar-
TABLE 8
GRIEVANCES
Arrestees Controls
Jobs ..................................... 54.1% 55.6%
Landlords ............................ 23.9% 28.1%
Housing .................................. 21.1% 37.9%
Education ....... .................... 16.0% 26.8%
W elfare ............................. 6.0% 3.3%
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restees are anomalous in this sense. Other than -for their intense an-
tipathy to police, in the main determined by their riot experience, they
were no more aggrieved than their community counterparts. Being
younger, they had less opportunity to experience discrimination in hous-
ing. Encounters with discriminatory practices in employment were al-
most precisely comparable in the two groups, even when age was
controlled.
The arrestees, in the main, clearly were not impelled to leave their
homes in the face of obvious danger and curfew proclamations by a
heightened sense of protest against social injustices personally experi-
enced. (A small segment of some 13 percent were intensely aggrieved,
however, and will be the subject of a separate paper.) Indeed the con-
trol males could be said to have suffered more from the inequities of the
system than the men who were arrested, probably because they were
older. It is possible, however, that the young are more sensitive to in-
justice and more likely to actively oppose it.
Fanily Structure
Hypotheses about civil disorder based upon family structure are
necessarily inadequate but developmental factors must be considered
in any theory which purports to explain the behavior of the arrestees
or the mass violence which erupted in Detroit. The mothers of both
the arrestees and the control group were consistently present during
their first eleven years of life to a remarkably similar extent.
TABLE 9
PRESENCE OF MOTHER
Arrestees Controls
First eleven years ...................... 83.0% 83.3%
Not at all ............................ 4.2% 8.5%
Eighty-four and four-tenths percent of the arrestees were raised by
their own mother and 83.3 percent of the riot area controls were sim-
ilarly privileged. Fathers are quite another matter. Only 56.1 percent
of the arrestees had a father present during these first eleven develop-
mental years while their control counterparts were significantly less
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deprived, inasmuch as 72 percent of them had a father with them dur-
ing this time.
TABLE 10
PRESENCE OF A FATHER
Arrestees Controls
First eleven years ..................... 56.1% 72.0%
Not at all ............................ 21.5% 16.3%
Additionally, 21.5 percent of the arrestees never lived with their
natural father. This compares to 16.3 percent for the community
controls who were so denied. These results hold with age controlled.
The adult male felt closest by the control Negro males was more
often the father (58.8 percent) than the adult male to whom the ar-
restee best related (48.8 percent).
White Friends
Some observers of the racial scene have proposed that urban rioting
is a result of increasing social distance between Negroes and whites.
However, both arrestees and controls had white friends in roughly the
same proportion. The cross-tabulations, however, find significances
which these frequency distributions do not show.
Political Awareness
Political awareness can be evaluated by questions which tap the
respondents' knowledge of Negro leaders or groups. The Detroit ar-
restees are not as informed about Negro political leadership or organi-
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zations as the riot area controls, although both groups are, in the main,
quite knowledgeable. Over 90 percent of the community males knew
the national leaders and organizations purporting to represent them.
They were least aware of local leaders and, surprisingly, the Black
Muslims.
TABLE 12
KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICAL LEADERS OR GRoUPs
Do Not Know About Arrestees Controls
Nicholas Hood1 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23.4% 6.5%
Rev. Albert Cleage? .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20.7% 12.4%
James Del Rio .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22.5% 13.7%
Martin Luther King ................... 0.0% 0.7%
John Conyers4 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17.7% 7.2%
Stokely Carmichael .................... 14.8% 3.3%
Adam Clayton Powell .................. 19.3% 0.7%
NAACP .............................. 7.7% 0.7%
SNCC ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12.1% 14.4%
Black Muslims ........................ 25.0% 0.7%
Urban League ........................ 22.5% 2.0%
1. Councilman. 4. U. S. Congressman.
2. Militant Black Nationalist. 5. Student Non-Violent Coordinating
3. State Senator. Committee.
Eighty percent of the arrestees were similarly informed and also
knew the local leadership less.
Progress and Hope
Discontent and hopelessness are psychological states which are often
popularly related. Hopelessness as a feeling that one's life is irreversibly
fixed at a level of dismal poverty, devoid of reward, self-respect,
or relief from anguish, is a term applied with great frequency to the
urban ghetto inhabitant. Would such entrapment, without promise
of success, lead to activitist, violent behavior, perhaps as a last desperate
measure? We attempted to assess dimensions of progress and hope
among both arrestees and community Negroes by asking them to place
themselves on Cantril's "Self-Anchoring Striving Scale" five years ago,
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now, and five years in the future. It is apparent from the following
table that both arrestees and community males feel that they have made
substantial progress during the past five years and are remarkably
optimistic about what the next five years will bring.
TABLE 13
PROGRESS AND HOPE
5 YEARs AGO Now 5 YEARS FRoM'Now
RUNGS
Arrestees Controls Arrestees Controls Arrestees Controls
10-8 .... 9.3% 4.6% 7.6% 17.6% 63.7% 52.3%
7-4 .... 36.1% 38.5% 1 66.9% 62.7% 32.6% 35.9%
3-0 .... 53.9% 54.3% 25.1% 17.7% 3.3% 7.3%
Five years ago both groups clustered on the lower rungs of the ladder,
but now place themselves halfway up on the middle four. Five years
from now with soaring optimism they expect to be viewing the world
from the very top of the ladder. The self-assessed progress and ex-
traordinary hopefulness are much the same for the two groups and
cannot be attributed to the exuberance of youth. When asked how
these goals might be achieved, the answers were "jobs and education."
Not all of these Negro males were optimistic, however, and we are
preparing a report on a particularly aggrieved, militant, and pessimistic
segment of the arrestees comprising some 13 percent of that group.
Entrapment in a life setting without progress or hope can hardly be
said to define the circumstances of either the arrestee or community
male. No attempt was made to relate such progress or hope to the
perceived status of the white community.
Cross Tabulations
These frequency distributions reveal that the arrestees are much
younger, less married, less affiliated with organizations of any kind
through which they might work to further racial or personal goals, and
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less conscious of political leadership than are the controls in the com-
munity riot area. Additionally they were more often raised in the
urban North and were either born in or came to Detroit much earlier
during their developmental years than the community males. They
were significantly more often raised in a family in which the father
was not present during the critical first eleven years. Finally, the level
of grievance and unemployment were much the same.
Cross tabulations among these frequencies were of considerable in-
terest. The younger the arrestee, the more likely he was to have spent
more years with his mother, less with his father, and to be socialized
in the urban North. These findings are not startling and hardly new,
inasmuch as they tend to confirm the observations of Myrdal,' 2 Glazer
and Moynihan,13 and Rainwater and Yancey,1 but in a riot arrestee
group. They are also consistent with our community data. Is there
something about lower class, northern urban life which interferes with
achievement and upward mobility for the male or predisposes him to
riot participation? The cross tabulation within the arrestee group could
not discover such a relationship. It seemingly made little difference to
the arrestees if a father was present or absent as regards achievement,
level of grievance, affiliation, marital status, attitudes toward the riot,
or political awareness. Yet the arrestees are a remarkably homogeneous
group and the intra-group differences are so small that they might not
reflect the influence of paternal deprivation upon these variables. Thus,
we ran similar cross tabulations upon the riot area control males who
were more heterogeneous and scattered in age and among social classes.
If the community Negroes are divided into three groups based upon
their avowed readiness to participate in a riot (high militant, middle
militant, and low militant) then some interesting correlations emerge.
Higher "militants," on the average, were younger than others. They
were more likely to have been raised in a home not having the con-
tinuous presence of a father. This association was especially strong
in the 20-39 age group. Their childhood families were also, on the
average, more impoverished than those of the middle and low militancy
responders and their parental heads tended to have less formal edu-
cation. It would seem logical that such family disorganization and low
income would be reflected in poorer education for their high militant
12. C. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN Dn~mmr (rev. ed. 1962).
13. N. GLAZER & D. MOYNIHAN, BEYOND TH MELTING POT (1963).
14. L. RArNwAT & W. YANCEY, THE MOYNHAN REPORT AM'f THE POLIrnCAL Commro-
VERSY (1967).
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offspring and a resultant inability to obtain remunerative employment.
Yet the "high militants" had as much formal education, the same
rate of employment, and as much income as the middle and low mili-
tants. Their hostility and activism apparently do not relate to these
often discussed factors but, in part, apparently relate to the very nature
of early family life itself without the support of a parental coalition
and in the day-to-day struggle to insure economic survival. The "high
militants" have also fared less well in their own marriages. Looking
just at males between 20 and 39, "high militant" respondents show a
higher rate of divorce and separation than their less angry counter-
parts. Is there a relationship between familial, marital, and social dis-
cord among the "high militants?" Are they diffusely enraged and
alienated not only because of the realities of Negro life in America
but also as a consequence of their socialization experience in broken
families? Our data do not permit an answer to this question. The com-
munity "high militants" also differ from other members of that sample
in that they have more grievances, more experiences with job dis-
crimination, and more feeling about police abuse.
We should note that our "high militants" are verbally more militant
than the majority of arrestees. For example, they view more favorably
a Negro leader like Stokely Carmichael and Negro organizations like
RAM or the Black Muslims. The community controls were not asked
whether they took part in the rioting. However, only one community
male indicated participation in response to the open ended question,
"[D]id you do anything different during the riot?"
One segment of the arrestee population can be described as alienated
and as hostile as the "high militant" community controls. Comprising
less than 15 percent of the arrestee sample, these were men who were
diffusely angry and, perhaps, ideologically driven. They were sig-
nificantly more hostile to police and white merchants than other ar-
restees. They also clearly viewed the riot as a protest and felt strongly
that it was directed at the white community. Their knowledge of
black nationalist political leaders was greater than other arrestees and
they also tended to more often express the conviction that another
riot was coming unless their grievances were redressed. In contrast
to the unbounded optimism of other arrestees, these men were more
realistic about their future. Their hostility toward whites was coupled
with a tendency to have no white friends. Employment, income, age,
and education were much the same in this grossly discontent minority
as with other arrestees.
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COMMUNITY NEGRO AND WHITE RIOT REACTIONS AND
RACIAL ATTITUDES
Now let us turn to an examination of Detroit residents' reactions to
the rioting of July, 1967. One can make a fair guess as to at least "net"
white and black reactions to the rioting.
Question 17: What would you say were the important causes
of the riot?
Our respondents, given free rein to name whatever causes each con-
sidered of primary importance, gave a variety of causes. Negroes and
whites tended to stress different causes. A substantial number of both
Negroes (35 percent) and whites (28 percent) mentioned rioters'
frustrations, restlessness, feelings of deprivation, or hopelessness. Their
references to these rioter characteristics were, if not always supportive,
rarely negative. On the other hand, whites (23 percent) more often
than Negroes (two percent) felt that the riots were primarily the
work of agitators, organizers, and criminals. Similarly, more whites
(23 percent) than Negroes (six percent) spoke of rioters as being
motivated by jealousy, greed, a desire to get something (not deserved)
for nothing, or by some other negative personal motive or trait. As
could be predicted from white complaints about the police, 10 percent
of whites spoke of the riot as resulting from an atmosphere of laxity
or ineffectiveness of law enforcement, lack of respect for authority,
etc. This kind of cause was rarely mentioned by Negroes.
Negroes more frequently than whites stressed institutional products
of the ghetto environment, such as lack of job opportunities, deficient
education, poor housing, and high prices relative to income. Interest-
ingly, Negroes were more apt than whites to put stress on better jobs
and incomes, while whites put relatively greater stress on better edu-
cation and housing as riot preventatives. One wonders whether, given
white attitudes toward integration, some white citations of education
as a preventative result from the belief that, if Negroes were better
educated, they would be less likely to riot.
In net, Negroes were much more likely to give a sympathetic re-
sponse to the plight of the rioter, or at least mention environmental
forces conducive to rioting as a form of protest. Whites were about
evenly split betveen negative, unsympathetic, critical, and "innate"
responses, and sympathetic or "environmental" responses. In fact, some
whites who offered several causes, offered one from each category.
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This summary of Negro and white responses to the open-ended
cause question is supported by a perhaps somewhat unfair closed ques-
tion we asked:
Question 8: Which of the following comes closest to explaining
why the riots took place?
(1) People were being treated badly,
(2) Criminals did it,
(3) People wanted to take things.
The results appear in Table 14.
TABLE 14
PERCENT OF WHITES AND BLAcKs WHO SELECTED EACH OF THREE
GIVEN STATEMENTS AS THAT WHICH "COMES CLOSEST TO
EXPLAINING WHY THE RIOTS TooK PLACE"
Whites Negroes
1. People were being mistreated ............ 28.0% 64.0%
2. Criminals did it ........................ 30.0% 10.0%
3. People wanted to take things ............ 35.0% 17.0%
When asked, in the succeeding question, which of these three "ex-
planations" is furthest from the correct explanation, nearly half of
whites chose "people were being mistreated." On the other hand, half
of our black respondents chose "criminals did it."
Thus, our data suggest there is no single, generally shared white
view of the causes of rioting. There is more agreement among Negroes,
but this agreement does not mean that a majority of the Negroes we
interviewed would take part in a riot, nor does it mean that most
Negroes were supportive of, and sympathetic to the rioters.
Question 9: Do you sympathize with the people who took part
in the rioting?
A majority of our respondents did not sympathize with the rioters.
Eighty percent of whites answered "No" to this question, as did 53
percent of Negroes. Only 30 percent of our black respondents, and
10 percent of whites replied "Yes." (The rest said "somewhat.")
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Among Negroes, sympathy is greater among younger adults, greater
among men than women, and greater among persons who have ex-
perienced job discrimination and those who have complaints about
police treatment. Among whites, these characteristics do not distinguish
the sympathetic from the unsympathetic. For whites and Negroes
sympathy is sympathy and does relate to other attitudes about the
riot to which it should relate. For example, 38 percent of whites who
chose "people were being treated badly" in answer to Question 7 said
they were either "sympathetic" or "somewhat sympathetic" to the
rioters (vs. less than 10 percent of those who endorsed the other two
possible causes). For Negroes, the relationship ran in the same direc-
tion. Sixty percent of Negroes who endorsed "mistreatment" as the
best of the three explanations for the riots said they were either
"sympathetic" or "somewhat sympathetic" to the rioters, versus only
22 percent of those Negroes who endorsed "criminals did it," or "people
wanted to take things."
From looking at the questions considered so far, one gets the im-
pression that the respondents see a distinction between the problems
existing in the inner city and especially in the Negro "riot area," and
in the riots themselves. We have seen that many Negroes who attest
that they are aware of and sympathetic to the problems of the poor
and the discriminated against, also are opposed to the riot as a form
of protest.
Separationists vs. Integrationists
Having described the more "militant" members of the Negro com-
munity, it would be of some interest to characterize the more ex-
tremist segment of the white community. Those white people who
assume the most intransigent position in favor of racial separation de-
serve our scrutiny inasmuch as they represent as powerful a conflict-
inducing force in our society as the black "high-militant." It would be
of considerable interest to know who they are, how they feel, and
what they want. For purposes of contrast we will examine white
Separationists and Integrationists. Separationists and Integrationists are
defined on the basis of their response to the following questions:
Question 1: Speaking in general terms, do you favor racial inte-
gration, total separation of the races, or something in between?
Question 2: Some people feel that white and Negro children
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should go to the same schools; others feel that they would learn
more and be happier in separate schools. What do you think?
Question 3: Here in Detroit, as in many places, different races of
people are living together in the same communities. Now I would
like you to think about the very best way that Negroes and whites
could live in the same place together. In other words, what would
be the very best kind of race relations, the most perfect, you could
imagine?
Separationists are those who opted for total separation of the races
on Question 1, separate schools on Question 2, and then specifically
indicated on Question 3 that they desired something less than total
integration. A combination of these responses left little doubt as to
the direction of their sympathies. Integrationists, on the other hand,
favored racial integration on Question 1 and school integration on
Question 2. Question 3 was not used to define the Integrationists.
These groups are not polar opposites on a spectrum of racial mixing,
but they do represent definite and meaningful contrasting strategies for
achieving racial balance in this country. Remember that white Sepa-
rationists comprise 16 percent of the sample while Integrationists com-
prise some 26 percent. The "in between" group, 58 percent of the
sample, can accept partial integration and their responses to all of our
questions invariably fell somewhere in the middle.
Attitudes of Separationists and Integrationist Whites Toward Negroes
Some whites who oppose integration do so with the conviction that
Negroes are intellectually and morally inferior. We attempted to tap
this belief by asking:
Question 36: On the whole, do you think that white people are
smarter than Negroes, Negroes are smarter than whites, or are
they about the same?
As anticipated, 67 percent of the Separationist group held the belief
that whites are smarter than Negroes. Integrationists were much less
likely to take this point of view, only 28 percent believing in white
superiority. Perceived differences in racial characteristics, as the above,
represent judgments which can be related to the concept of racial dis-
tance.
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TABLE 15
RESPONDENTS Co lPARE WHITE AND NEGRO INTELLIGENCE
Question: On the whole, do you think that white people are smarter
than Negroes, Negroes are smarter than whites, or are they about the
same?
Separation
Group
67.0%
25.0%
6.0%
Response
Whites are smarter than Negroes .........
They are about the same ................
Negroes are smarter than whites .........
Another measure of such distance is the frequency or strength of social
involvement across races. We asked:
Questioi 37: Do you have any fairly close friends who are
Negro?
Here again an impressive but predictable difference is found between
the two groups. Separationists (see Table 16) are much less likely
to have black friends than Integrationists, probably indicative of fewer
meaningful social contacts and less opportunity to evaluate Negroes
in reality rather than fantasy. When age is controlled by comparing
TABLE 16
PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS WITH NEGRO FRIENDS
Question: Do you have any fairly close friends who are Negro?
Integration Separation
Response Group Group
1. Yes ................................... 53.0% 19.0%
2. No ................................... 47.0% 81.0%
people in the 20-39 bracket the differences remain the same but ten
percent more of both groups are found to have black friends.
Black power as seen through the eyes of our white respondents
Integration
Group
28.0%
69.0%
1.0%
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provides another assessment of their attitudes toward Negroes. We
asked:
Question 34: What do the words "Black Power" mean to you?
We found our groups differing in response. Respondents in our Inte-
gration group were more likely than those in the Separation group to
speak of the term meaning "a fair share for Negroes," or "Black
Unity" or the like (24 percent vs. seven percent in the other group)
and less likely to speak of "Black Racism," or "black rule over whites,"
or "trouble and disorder" or the like (43 percent vs. 64 percent in the
other group).
Whites who wish to live apart from Negroes then appear to be
personally threatened by them, tend not to know them socially, and
view them as intellectually inferior. These statistically derived con-
clusions about the attitudes of Separationists are strongly supported by
anecdotal material found in their interviews. Yet the Separationists
have allowed themselves the least opportunity to learn about Negroes
first-hand through social relationships and many of their impressions
must be a product of fantasy.
Riot Attitudes of Separationists and Integr-ationists
As the two groups differed in their responses to various questions
about race relations, they also differed on their perceptions of the riot.
To begin with, let us look at respondents' perceptions of causes of the
riot. As you recall, we asked this question in two forms, a closed-end
form and an open-ended form. First, we will consider the closed-
end form of the question.
Question 8: Which of the following comes closest to explaining
why the riot took place? (1) People were being treated badly;
(2) Criminals did it; (3) People wanted to take things?
Table 17 shows the responses for our two white groups. These data
indicate a difference between the members of the integration group and
those who have separationist beliefs.
It is, however, clear that the Integrationists and Separationists are in
no sense diametically opposed in response to this question. Only 47
percent of the Integration group answered mistreatment in preference
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TABLE 17
CAUSES OF RIOT AS SEEN BY WHITE RESPONDENTS VARYING IN
THEIR SUPPORT FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION
Question: Which of the following comes closest to explaining why
the riot took place: (1) People were being treated badly; (2) Criminals
did it; or (3) People wanted to take things?
Integration Separation
Response Group Group
1. People were being treated badly .......... 47.0% 20.0%
2. Criminals did it ........................ 18.0% 32.0%
3. People wanted to take things ............ 31.0% 40.0%
to the other two alternatives, whereas slightly more than half indicated
that they felt that either criminals did it or people wanted to take things.
If we look at the open-ended form of this question we see a similar
pattern of responses.
Question 17: What would you say were the important causes of
the riot?
About twenty percent of each group indicated that agitators, hood-
lums, or communists were responsible for the riot. A higher proportion
of Separationists emphasize negative motives for the riot. They speak
of greed, jealousy, laziness, and similar motives. The Integration group,
on the other hand, is more likely to mention frustration, and anger,
without apparent negative reference. The Separationists speak of the
temper of the times. ("Riots were occurring all over.") The Inte-
grationists are more likely to mention economic factors, education,
housing, and other social needs. Again in response to this question, the
Separation group sees the least justification for the riot. They make the
most negative references to Negroes and to black rioters.
Question 9: Do you sympathize with people who took part in
the riot?
The data for this question is presented in Table 18. As can be seen, a
majority of whites, even in the Integration group, answered "No" to
this question, and that percentage is higher in the Separation group.
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TABLE 18
DEGREE OF SYMPATHY WITH RIOTERS IN GROUPS OF WHITE RESPONDENTS
VARYING IN THEIR SUPPORT FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION
Question: Do you sympathize with the people who took part in the
riot?
Integration Separation
Response Group Group
1. Y es ................................... 21.0% 3.0%
2. Somewhat ............................. 12.0% 8.0%
3. N o ................................... 64.0% 86.0%
(It seems hardly necessary or surprising to point out here that there
were white respondents who blamed the riots on Negro frustration,
socio-economic ills, and deprivation but who, at the same time, said
that they were not at all sympathetic to the rioters.)
We asked what could be done to prevent future riots. Here the dif-
ferences in attitudes were quite striking (Table 19).
TABLE 19
PROPOSALS FOR PREVENTING FUTURE RIOTS ADVOCATED BY WHITE
RESPONDENTS VARYING IN SUPPORT FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION
Question: What things could be done so that there will not be another
riot?
Integration Separation
Response Group Group
1. Programs improving socio-economic and/or
educational status of Negroes; ending dis-
crimination ............................ 48.0% 14.0%
2. Self-determination for Negroes; fair share.. 3.0% 3.0%
3. Stronger police action; improved police
methods; stronger law enforcement ....... 20.0% 56.0%
4. Closer race relations .................... 11.0% 8.0%
5. Nothing can be done; nothing will work... 4.0% 11.0%
6. Don't know; no answer ................. 12.0% 8.0%
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Nearly half of the Integrationists spoke of helping the Negroes, set-
ting up programs to improve their life, ending discrimination, and
programs for economic, educational, and housing upgrading. Only 14
percent of the Separation group agreed with this point of view. Fifty-
six percent of the Separation group responded to this question in terms
of stronger police action, improved police methods, more stringent
enforcement of the laws (although the latter response was given less
frequently than the first two responses). Only 20 percent of the Inte-
gration group made a response categorizable in this way. The Inte-
gration group was less likely to see the situation as hopeless or to feel
that nothing could be done (although this difference among the groups
was not significant). One future analysis we have in mind will sepa-
rate what one could call the punitive from the efficiency responses in
terms of police action; to separate the "use more force," "stiffer sen-
tences" responses from those framed in terms of "better training,"
"more police," "improved methods." We would like to see whether
these two kinds of augmentation of police effectiveness relate to other
responses on the questionnaire, so that we can better characterize the
white population. We certainly have a significant proportion of whites
who desire more police activity and control.
We asked why people thought another riot was coming. The major
difference here resulted from the fact that Separationists continued to
speak of riot causation in negative terms, either negatively categorizing
the persons involved (agitators, hoodlums, gangsters, etc.) or by ascrib-
ing unfavorable personal characteristics to them. Sixty-one percent of
the Separation group made those mentions as opposed to only 22 per-
cent of the Integrationists.
As we discussed the variation among our two white groups on points
of view on the riot and on race relations we have noted that our groups
differed in the strategies they endorsed for improving race relations
and preparing for future urban racial violence. We noted above that
whites generally viewed the black community as violent and the rioters
as criminals but that this attitude was found most often among the
Separationists. When we asked about prevention of future riots, we
noted that the Integration group was much more likely to talk about
social and economic improvement programs, whereas the Separation
group was the most likely to see future riot prevention in terms of
improved training, more policemen, stricter enforcement of law, and
heavier penalties for violation of the law. The only question we asked
which mentioned a policy toward dealing with urban problems was:
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Question 32: Do you feel that more money or less money should
be spent on trying to improve conditions?
Responses to this question are consistent with the two questions on the
causes of the riot and the means for preventing future riots (Table
20).
TABLE 20
A.TTITUDES TOWARD FUNDING OF FUTURE PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE
CONDITIONS (IN THE INNER CrY), HELD BY WHITE RESPOND-
ENTS VARYING IN SUPPORT FOR RACIA& INTEGRATION
Question: Do you feel that more money or less money should be
spent in trying to improve conditions?
Integration Separation
Response Group Group
1. More money ........................... 72.0% 25.0%
2. The same amount of money ............. 15.0% 25.0%
3. Less money ............................ 9.0% 50.0%
If one assumes, as the context of this question suggests, that improving
conditions means improving the lot of the Negro or his way of life
in the inner city, almost three-quarters of the Integration group would
be willing to spend more money to achieve this purpose. Only nine
percent said less. On the other hand, only 25 percent of the respondents
in the Separation group said that they felt more money should be spent
and half of this group said that they felt less money should be ap-
propriated for this purpose.
Personal and Social Characteristics of White Separationists and Inte-
grationists
We attempted to see whether at least some potential "predisposing"
factors can be found in the personal histories of whites differing in
support for separation. Let us look first at the personal histories of the
respondents. The Separationist is much older than the Integrationist.
His median age is 55 compared to 41 for the Integrationist. We asked
about place of birth, area of socialization, and parental education, etc.
At the beginning of the study we expected that there would be a
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higher proportion of persons born in the South or in a border state
among the whites favoring separation than there would be among those
whites who favored racial integration. There was no difference among
our groups in portion of respondents born in Michigan, born in the
North, born in the South or born in a foreign country. However,
when we look at the responses to the question:
Question 33: Were you brought up mostly on a farm, in a
town, in a small city or in a large city or a suburb of a city?
we find that a significantly higher proportion of Integrationists were
raised in a large city (generally, this city was Detroit). This difference
among the groups appears to be partly associated with the difference
in age. When we control for age, these differences diminish. If we look
at the respondents' reports of their fathers' education we find a slight
and non-significant tendency for the parent of the Separationist to be
less educated. Again, we should note an association between age of
the respondent and father's reported education. (We have noted above
an association between respondent's age and his own education.)
When we look at the formal education for the two groups (Table
21), members of the Integration group have, on average, the most
TABLE 21
EDUCATION OF WHITE RESPONDENTS VARYING IN
SUPPORT FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION
Integration Separation
Respondent Education Group Group
1. 8 grades or less* ........................ 16.0% 31.0%
2. From 9 to 11 grades* ................... 14.0% 36.0%
3. 12 grades* ............................. 31.0% 31.0%
4. Some college or college degree ............ 33.0% 3.0%
*These categories include persons who have had non-college education in addi-
tion to that defining category (such as special job training, etc.).
formal education and respondents in the Separation group have the
least. For example, 33 percent of the Integration group report having
at least some college education; the percentage for respondents in the
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Separation group is three percent. In addition, 30 percent of the Inte-
gration group had less than 12 years of formal eduaction as opposed
to some 67 percent of the respondents in the Separation group. Younger
respondents tend to have more formal education, on the average
than those who are older. For this reason, we controlled for age across
the groups, selecting the 20 to 39 category. We did not look at males
alone because the proportion of males and females in the three samples
is roughly equal. For this restricted group we found that 57 percent
of those in the Integration group had at least some college education
as opposed to about ten percent of the respondents in the Separation
group. Seventeen percent of the respondents in the Integration group
had less than twelve years of formal education versus 50 percent of
the respondents in the Separation group. When we control for age, we
create smaller samples, so these data should be considered only sug-
gestive.
We noted in the arrestee section of this paper that a strong ma-
jority of black respondents felt that they would approach their con-
ception of the best life for them in the next five years. This was not
the case for white respondents. Slightly less than half of our white
respondents felt that their lives would improve within the next five
years with respect to their view of the ideal. Our two white groups
differered on this question, but not significantly. The Integration group
was slightly more optimistic than was the Separation group. Fifty-
eight percent of the Integration group said they felt their lives would
get better, versus 47 percent of the Separationists. Eleven percent of
the Integrationists felt their lives would get worse as opposed to 22
percent of the Separationists. When we controlled for age and looked
only at respondents between the ages of 20 and 39, we find these
younger respondents generally more optimistic than those who are
older and we find that differences among the groups halve. In this
age group about 70 percent of respondents felt that their lives would
get better over the next five years. About seven to eight percent thought
that their lives would get worse. When we asked our respondents to
rank their present life from zero to ten on a Cantril ladder (ten indicat-
ing that their present life is the same as their ideal, zero indicat-
ing that their present is as far as possible from the ideal), we find
that, on the average, whites rate their present lives slightly higher than
do Negroes. The median rating is about six. We again find, looking
at our two groups, that Integrationists tend to rate their present lives
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slightly higher than do respondents favoring racial separation. (The
median rating for the Integration group was seven, that for the Sepa-
radon group was six.) If we look only at respondents between the ages
of 20 and 39 we find roughly the same difference. These differences
appear to hold for respondents in their 40's and 50's, but in those age
groups the number of respondents in the Separation group is quite
small, the figures for this group are, therefore, relatively unstable. When
asked to describe their best life in their own words the respondents
who favor racial separation are more likely than others to speak of
tranquility, peace, the ending of conflict, war, and violence. On the
other hand, the Integration group is more likely to speak of their best
life in terms of better income and better-paying or more satisfying
jobs.
Trust, Political Attitudes and Behavior of Separationists and Inte-
grationists
Belief in the reliability and good will of others may be both a meas-
ure of security and a willingness to engage people socially. We asked
the question:
Question 34: Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing
with people?
Separationists are a suspicious group, inasmuch as only 35 percent
felt that most people could be trusted. Integrationists are far more
willing to believe in others. Seventy-five percent thought that most
people could be trusted. Similar percentages were obtained in response
to a question about trust in government.
The Separationists were even more doubtful about the reliability of
the federal government, only 25 percent expressing the feeling that it
could be trusted, as compared to 70 percent for the Integrationists.
Similar differences held when we looked at only one sex and con-
trolled for age. Confidence in city government ran in the same direction
for both groups, although the differences were not as great. For ex-
ample, 53 percent of the respondents in the Integration group were
trusting of city government to do what is right "just about always"
or "most of the time," as compared with only 30 percent of Sepa-
rationists.
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Knowing that Separationists are suspicious and wary of government
and that Integrationists are far more trusting, we were interested in
the political behavior of both groups.
TABLE 22
POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF WHITE RESPONDENTS
VARYING IN SUPPORT FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION
Integration Separation
Response Group Group
1. "Strong" Democrat ..................... 15.0% 22.0%
2. "Not-Strong" Democrat .................. 20.0% 19.0%
3. Independent ........................... 42.0% 28.0%
4. "Not-Strong" Republican ............... 12.0% 14.0%
5. "Strong" Republican ................... 4.0% 3.0%
6. Apolitical .............................. 7.0% 14.0%
Their loyalties to the two major parties are quite similar. However,
the Integrationists are independent voters more often while Sepa-
rationists tend to be more often without political ties of any kind, al-
though this~apolitical group is small.
In terms of political awareness, neither group is particularly knowl-
edgeable about our system. Many more Integrationists than the Sepa-
rationists knew the correct length of a United States senatorial term.
Both were equally as ignorant of the results of the 1966 congressional
elections.
Another measure of political attitudes and behavior, probably re-
lated to trust in government, is a citizen's sense of his political power
as an individual. We asked:
Question 25: How much political power do you think people
like you have; a great deal, some, not very much or none?
Eighty-one percent of the group espousing separation felt that
people like themselves had either "not very much" or "no" political
power. This sense of political powerlessness was communicated by
only 50 percent of the group for integration. Another question tapping
feelings about political power was asked:
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TABLE 23
INDICATORS OF POLITICAIL KNOWLEDGE OF WHITE RESPONDENTS
VARYING IN SUPPORT FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION
(A) Question: About how many years does a United States Senator
serve: two, four, six, or eight?
Integration Separation
Response Group Group
1. Two years ............................. 5.0% 11.0%
2. Four years ............................ 38.0% 41.0%
3. Six years .............................. 37.0% 20.0%
4. Eight years ............................ 5.0% 5.0%
5. Don't know ........................... 15.0% 19.0%
(B) Question: Do you know which political party elected the most
Congressmen in the national election of 1966?
Integration Separation
Response Group Group
1. Democratic ............................ 37.0% 28.0%
2. Republican ............................ 46.0% 42.0%
3. Don't know ............................ 15.0% 31.0%
Question 28: Suppose a law were being considered by the De-
troit Common Council that you considered very unjust or harm-
ful. What do you think you could do about it?
Responses to this question reveal even more acute differences between
these two groups of whites than those which resulted from the answers
to questions on governmental trust and political power. Sixty-nine
percent of the Separation group felt that nothing could be done, that
they had no influence on or power to control vital governmental de-
cisions which might affect their lives. Only 19 percent of these re-
spondents favoring integration considered themselves to be so politically
impotent. Such a finding cannot be translated into psychological help-
lessness or powerlessness on other levels because the question dealt
only with political referents.
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TABLE 24
STRATEGIES TO COMBAT PASSAGE OF HARMFUL LAW, SUGGESTED
BY WHITE RESPONDENTS VARYING IN SUPPORT
FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION
Question: Suppose a law were being considered by the (Detroit)
Common Council that you considered very unjust or harmful. What
do you think you could do about it?
Integration Separation
Response Group Group
1. Non-violent demonstration .............. 3.0% 0%
2. Violent protest, rioting .................. 0% 0%
3. Work through formal, or informal group... 12.0% 8.0%
4. Work as individual; writing; contacting
officials, etc ............................ 57.0% 14.0%
5. Nothing could be done; nothing would do
any good .............................. 19.0% 69.0%
Attitudes Toward Leaders and Organizations of the Two White Groups
The Separationists viewed more positively those leaders and groups
identified with anti-Negro and anti-civil rights stances. They were
more supportive of Mary Beck, a conservative Detroit Councilwoman,
and Breakthrough, a radical right organization which has repeatedly
associated Communism with the civil rights movement.
Separationists were even less in favor of racial moderates as Martin
Luther King than the Integrationists. In neither group was there any
support for Black Nationalists as Stokely Carmichael or the Detroit-
based Rev. Albert Cleage.
DIscUssIoN
It would be foolhardy to derive some grand design or conceptual
schema to explain contemporary American urban civil disorder from
data gathered in one city and so limited in its scope. As psychiatrists
and psychologists, our concerns and constructs tend to emphasize indi-
vidual psychological states. It is obviously impossible from these data
to irrefutably support any single, meaningful hypothesis which ex-
plains why, at this time in our history, collective violence has become
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endemic in our cities. With the caveat that we probably missed a
significant segment of activitist rioters, we have been able to interview
a large number of persons who were on the streets and to compare
them on a number of important variables with a control group of
men drawn randomly from the community. We have also been able
to assess the attitudes and characteristics of non-participant Negroes
and whites in the community.
It has always been an almost reflex assumption that civil disorder
issues from accumulated grievances which the protest group, perhaps
because of some precipitating injustice, suddenly finds no longer bear-
able. A logical corollary of such an assumption would seem to be the
stronger the grievance the more powerful the protest. The riot was
a form of protest, yet the grievance level of our arrestees, on the
average, was no higher than the community controls and in some areas
was of even less intensity. Both groups were deeply concerned about
job discrimination and both felt exploited by the profit strategies of
inner city merchants. The police were far more a source of concern
to the arrestees but this antipathy was, in the main, determined by
riot experiences. Powerful grievances exist in the Detroit Negro com-
munity but the arrestees were not impelled to take to the streets by any
more heightened sense of injustice.
Additionally, when one considers that 82 percent of the non-student
arrestees were employed and earning $115 weeldy, the motivation of
the great majority cannot be attributed to joblessness. There was much
employment uncertainty in this group but again no greater than that
which exists in the riot area community.
This data can be organized in another manner. The arrestees and
the "high militant" riot prone controls are similar in many important
respects and do differ from those men in the community who could
not see themselves as active in any future civil disorder. Although the
control "high militants" and the arrestees are not precisely alike, their
commonalities justify their inclusion in a group which we shall label
"activist," a term defined by either arrest or an avowed willingness by
a control subject to riot, should the occasion present itself.
The area in which a man spent his childhood socialization years
seems to relate to "activism" as we have defined it. It further seems
to matter whether persons born in the South came to a northern city
prior to or after the age of 15. There are several possible explanations
for these correlations:
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(1) By the age of 15 an aggression control mechanism based
upon white supremacism has been well incorporated, resulting in
a more passive posture and acceptance of the social structure.
(2) Exposure to two different and conflicting systems of self-
assessment, expectations, rewards, and punishments prior to the
time when one has been fully internalized may lead to a con-
tinuing search (as testing the white power structure through
rioting) for an appropriate assumptive system and identity for-
mation to resolve the conflict.
(3) Persons who come North prior to the age of 15 are
more likely than those who migrate after that age to experience
family disruption during early developmental years under the
stress of urbanization.
Regardless of which theoretical notion seems most applicable, regu-
lation of aggression toward whites is determined by different psycho-
logical mechanisms in the northern Negro as compared to the Negro
raised in the South. A self-concept organized around the social justice
attitudes of the North may also be a factor in that Negroes socialized
in the North justifiably feel entitled to a fair share distribution of the
rewards and resources of our society. The whole concept of depriva-
tion is related to what one feels he deserves and should be allowed to
work toward. The southern Negro indoctrinated by a value system
which has deemed him innately inferior to whites will not experience
deprivation in a social, economic, or political setting in which the
northern-raised Negro would feel profoundly thwarted and deprived.
It is our contention that the childhood years of socialization and self-
concept formation are among the more important determinants of a
subordinate group's willingness to remain passive or to assert itself
aggressively in protest or revolution. That northern urbanization con-
tributes to militancy in the conventional sense has already been demon-
strated by Marx.' 5 In Protest and Prejudice, he described the social and
psychological context of middle-class militancy which involved mem-
bership in organizations devoted to the implementation of racial goals
and effort within the rules of the established political system. The
Detroit riot arrestees were not, in net, the civil rights militants de-
scribed by Marx. Although when contrasted with the total community
15. G. MARX, PROTEST AND PREJUDICE (1967). See also J. Fischoff, "The Effects of
Poverty and Urbanization on Family Life" contained in THE DETROIT RioT, A STUDY
oF BLACK AeVISM AND WmTE RESPONSE, ch. - (in press); S. GLuECK & E. GLIECr,
UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1950).
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control group, arrestees showed pride in being black, only a minority
seemed politically aware or ideologically oriented. The arrestees, when
compared with controls, were unaffiliated in almost every sense, be-
longing to fewer organizations which might implement personal or
community goals. This disaffiliation was not attributable to their youth
and together with their lack of ideological fervor marked them as
being, in the main, apolitical, unlike the "high militant" controls who
were joiners and ideologically aware. Both arresteees and "high mili-
tants," however, had little faith in the efficacy of the political process
and tended to view themselves as having little or no power to influence
government at any level.
Loss of father is another variable which is correlated with our type
of "activism." Relationships between the disruption of family life and
northern urbanization have already been drawn in this paper. Such
disruption is significantly greater among the "activists" than it is among
the less "militant" controls. The finding that in Detroit, at least, the
younger Negro arrestees did not have a father continuously in the
home until the age of eleven as often as their older counterparts would
indicate that such family disruption is increasing in the lower class.
Extended kinship families in which aunts or grandparents act as sur-
rogate mothers or fathers may well be adequate socialization units
where closeness and affectional attachments are greater than in many
white middle or upper-class families. Our findings do not represent
value judgments, and the significance for the arrestees of early family
life disrupted in the conventional sense is difficult to determine. How-
ever, a number of studies have described the deleterious effects of pa-
ternal deprivation upon the personality development of young children
in both black and white families.16 However, it must always be borne
in mind that paternal deprivation tends to be accompanied by various
forms of social and economic deprivation.
First, the father's absence can place an intolerable burden on the
lower-class Negro mother. Without support from a husband, she may
have to be both the breadwinner and the guide and tutor of her children.
If harassed and overwhelmed by what is often a daily battle for sur-
vival, she may offer her children only insufficient emotional and cog-
nitive stimulation. Lower-class Negro children tend to enter the school
system disadvantaged in several respects. Middle-class families are
likely to better prepare their children for school, for there is more
16. Supra note 15.
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time and money. Because the lower-class Negro mother may not have
the time or sometimes even the strength, the early learning of the dis-
advantaged child is often grossly neglected, resulting in deficits in the
use of and understanding of formal language and abstract thinking.'7
When he enters the school system, he may be further handicapped by
an inflexible bureaucracy organized around certain assumptions as to
the kind of readiness and ability to learn of the lower-class child. The
ensuing clash between the child and the system can produce a repeated
cycle of failure, humiliation, apathy, defeat, and a growing reactive
defiance. The relative inadequacy of inner city schools together with
the defeatism and low-achievement expectancies of some teachers con-
tributes to the cycle. Education has always been a vehicle for upward
mobility in America, and if the lower-class Negro child cannot com-
pete in our educational system, he may not be allowed to compete as
an adult for certain skilled jobs and high levels of economic security.
Secondly, a stable male figure in the family provides a sense of security,
discipline, and a model for identification. Boys raised in disorganized,
fatherless families perceive their mothers' image of men as not trust-
worthy or reliable, and as elusive figures who come and go and do not
care for the children. These boys grow up with a sense of isolation
and minimal self-esteem.' These early experiences within an im-
poverished family lacking a parental coalition and an educational sys-
tem unable to meet his needs, together with repeated exposure to the
vocabulary of militancy, may provide the setting for riot activism.
It is impossible to determine the extent of social relatedness, the
quality or enduring nature of friendships and affectional attachments
and the loyalties of either the arrestees or the "high-militant" com-
munity controls. We do know that for some reason these "activists"
did not affiliate. They were more likely than were the non-riot prone
controls to remain single and apparently did not believe in the value
of organizations as systems for achieving personal goals: at least not
racial or community goals. A majority were not the street comer man
of "Talley's Corner," ', being steadily employed and living with fam-
ily. Yet, were a significant number, perhaps, suffering from a type of
big city anomie, a type of normlessness and lack of identity which
Liebow observed in his street corner group and whose origins can be
17. See generally Anderson, Where's Dad?, A.M.A. ARCH. GEN. PsYcHAT. (June,
1968).
18. See generally E. SILBEMAN, CRIsis IN BLACK AND WHTE (1964).
19. E. LIE~ow, TALLY'S CORNER (1967).
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partly found in the destructive impact of urbanization upon lower
class family life? Was the riot then for many an opportunity for self-
assertion, for the protest, identity-reaching, and limit-testing so often
found in adolescent behavior? Was it not only expressive black self-
assertion but also a way of seeking a better definition of the relation-
ship of blacks to whites, a relationship much less structured and more
distant in the North than in the South?
The interpretation of the riot as inter-racial communication and
rapprochement-seeking may seem patently absurd upon first exami-
nation. However, segregation in the North, in all of its forms, has been
increasing. In education, housing, and social intercourse, contacts be-
tween Negroes and whites in Detroit have been diminishing and prob-
ably occur with much less frequency than they do in the southern
communities. Although social distance from whites is approximately the
same among both the arrestees and the riot area controls there is a posi-
tive correlation in the arrested group between a favorable view of the
riot and alienation from whites. In addition, a majority of both the
Negro arrestees and controls anticipate that the riot will effect not
only a greater awareness among whites of the Negro plight but also
compassionate white responses in the direction of alleviating black
suffering.
If the riot for the great majority of arrestees was an expressive, dis-
organized, and anomic uprising, were there men among the "activists"
with a revolutionary animus? We have no way of assessing the extent
of their participation in the riot, but those men with the highest level
of protest animosity comprised some 15 percent of the "activist" group
and had the following profile: (1) born in Detroit or migrated before
the age of 15, (2) lost his father prior to the age of eleven, (3) raised
in greater poverty than other respondents and by more poorly edu-
cated parents, (4) 20 to 24 years of age, (5) experienced discrimi-
nation by employers, (6) felt exploited by white merchants, (7) felt
intense animosity toward police, probably motivated by some humiliat-
ing personal encounter, (8) was socially alienated from whites, (9)
acknowledged progress during past five years in Detroit but is less
optimistic about future than others, (10) was exposed to the rhetoric
of black militancy through black nationalist leadership and programs,
(11) considered himself to be without political power, (12) was un-
affiliated with racial or community organizations, and (13) thought
that another riot was coming unless the system changed. Education,
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employment, income, or marital status of these intensely aggrieved
"activists" were not distinguishing variables.
It is obvious that the complexity of the Detroit riot does not allow
for simplistic explanatory hypotheses. The participants were too varied
in motivation, character, and background. In this paper we have fo-
cussed upon those factors which seem to contribute to "activism,"
defined either as arrest or the expressed willingness of a non-arrestee
control to riot at some future time. The usual causal notions as pov-
erty, apathy, hopelessness, unemployment, urban shock, or hoodlum-
ism are not generally applicable to the mass violence which erupted in
Detroit during July of 1967. Such a statement does not deny the
existence of poverty, unemployment, or apathy, in urban ghettoes or
the great need for programs to relieve the very real anguish which is
endemic there. If Detroit is at all representative, civil disorder in
America is a consequence of the coming of age of the first sizeable
black generation socialized in the egalitarian North, raised with hope
and promise, exposed to the rhetoric of black militancy but suffering
from the effects of urbanization upon family structure and contact
with a more subtle, covert form of white hostility. One can speculate
that the riot has become the expressive or emotive mode of protest
for the young blue-collar Negro male, unaffiliated, alienated but in-
creasingly black-conscious, upwardly mobile and no longer fearful of
expressing his aggression. The Detroit "activist" was not a committed
revolutionary in the summer of 1967, but black nationalism may con-
tinue to attract his advocacy and loyalty in growing numbers.
In the face of this perplexing onslaught of black activism and its
destructive effect upon their cities, whites and Negroes have responded
in diverse ways.
Despite the exhortations and posturing of black separatists, the over-
whelming majority of Negroes in Detroit are still convinced that inte-
gration is the only way to resolve racial conflict and to achieve
egalitarian goals. Most Separatists are whites who still resist full ac-
ceptance of Negroes, although more than sixty percent can live with a
partial form of integration (whatever "partial" means). Among many
white Detroiters, the belief still exists that Negroes are less intelligent,
inclined to violence and criminality and must be educated and up-
graded in their life style before racial mixing can be successful. A sub-
stantial number of whites would like to see Negroes gain better hous-
ing, employment, and education, but are still desirous of maintaining
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protective racial barriers about their own homes. The 26 percent of
whites who expressed the desire for closer personal contact with
Negroes were younger and better educated and probably represent
that segment of the community most likely to abandon the city for the
suburbs.
The riot surprised most of the white community. Many whites, per-
haps in part as a result of surprise, tended to assume that it had a con-
spiratorial basis and was the work of hoodlums, or agitators (perhaps
communists). Not only were whites opposed to the riot as a form of
protest but they were generally unsympathetic to the rioters to whom
they attributed venal motives, such as greed, laziness, and criminality.
Although these negative ascriptions were in the majority,. there was a
sizeable minority of whites who understood the riot as an outburst of
frustration and rage, resulting from years of mistreatment and discrimi-
nation.
From our white interviews we were able to distinguish two con-
trasting groups in profound disagreement as to the manner in which
black and white Detroiters should live together (one espousing com-
plete separation of the races, the other advocating integration). The
majority of whites were somewhere in the middle. Although the
Separatists were but 16 percent of the sample, they represent a force
for divisiveness and conflict in this city which should be better under-
stood. It is apparent from our data that Separatists are deeply threatened
by the black community, particularly by the potential for violence and
power which they ascribe to it. They were naturally most unsympa-
thetic to rioters whom they described as criminals, hoodlums, and
communists, and had little understanding or emphathy for Negroes liv-
ing in the inner city. They also saw widespread support for the riot
in the black community, far more than actually exists, at least from
our data. Tending to oppose government programs for the improve-
ment of black lives through educational and economic measures, they
supported rigorous law enforcement as the only way to control civil
disorder. Their opposition to both militant and moderate civil rights
leaders was striking, as was their approval of conservative "law and
order" leaders as Detroit councilwoman Mary Beck and even the local
radical right organization called Breakthrough.
Separationists were also older and more often raised in a rural environ-
ment than Integrationists. They were less educated and less knowledge-
able about political leaders or groups. Of considerable importance was
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the finding that they saw themselves as poorly represented by their
leaders. Separationists were mistrustful and suspicious of government
at all levels and viewed themselves as being politically powerless, un-
able to influence decisions which might personally affect them. For
those persons advocating complete racial separation in Detroit in 1967,
the Negro revolution is, perhaps, a terrifying and foreign force threaten-
ing to overwhelm and destroy them. We are in no position to say what
personal psychological forces are at work here, but this group con-
siders itself to be profoundly vulnerable to the massive and rapidly
moving egalitarian social forces of this decade. The Separationists ap-
parently feel deserted and forgotten by a government whose attentions,
energies and, perhaps, affections have been usurped by the interloping
newcomer, the urban Negro, who is threatening to displace them. A
most striking similarity between white Separationists and black militants
were feelings of relative political powerlessness, and impotence to in-
fluence those external forces which governed and controlled important
aspects of their lives.
These "Separatist" whites and "Militant" Negroes are, in a sense,
polarizing factions within Detroit. One can speculate that they are
remarkably alike in terms of how they view their position in this com-
munity, especially with respect to power. In a sense they tend to see
themselves as vulnerable and powerless, and at the mercy of external
and malevolent forces. For many white "Separatists" these external
and evil forces are "black power" and a government which seems to
support and encourage it. For many of the black "High-Militants"
they are white racism and a government which covertly maintains it.
Both groups sharpen the conflict and reduce it to simple terms in a
remarkably similar way. For most other Detroiters the solutions to
racial conflict are not quite as simple. Many in all groups wish the
race problem away. It is doubtful that such wishes will be fulfilled
in Detroit or any other major American city.
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